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1. Introduction	
There	is	something	counterintuitive	about	imposing	democracy	on	peoples.	In	the	recent	debate	in	
political	and	legal	philosophy,	many	have	argued	against	the	human	right	to	democracy,	often	on	
grounds	of	its	conflict	with	another	right,	the	right	to	self-determination	(e.g.	Cohen	2006;	Lister	
2012;	Reidy	2012).	The	thought	is	that	the	human	right	to	self-determination,	which	allows	peoples	
to	choose	their	own	constitution	and	development,	would	be	undermined	by	the	human	right	to	
democracy,	which	requires	a	specific	constitution	and	thus	restricts	developmental	choices.		
Thomas	Christiano,	in	his	contribution	to	this	volume,	challenges	this	line	of	thought.	He	argues	that,	
properly	understood,	the	right	to	self-determination	presupposes	the	right	to	democracy.	
Christiano’s	argument	reverses	the	order	of	priority	between	the	two	rights.	He	aims	to	show	that	
the	right	to	democracy	has	priority	over	the	right	to	self-determination.	But	he	also	wants	to	argue	
that	affirming	the	priority	of	democracy	need	not	imply	reserving	the	right	to	self-determination	to	
democratic	peoples.	The	innovative	core	of	his	paper	consists	in	his	proposal	for	how	the	right	to	
																																								 																				
1	I	greatly	benefitted	from	a	series	of	workshops	on	human	rights	that	Rowan	Cruft	and	others	organized	at	the	
University	of	Stirling.	I’m	also	very	grateful	for	comments	I’ve	received	from	Tom	Christiano	and	Massimo	
Renzo.	
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democracy	can	be	made	compatible	with	the	right	to	self-determination	even	for	peoples	that	are	
not	democratic.		
Christiano’s	argument	involves	the	following	main	steps.	He	first	defends	the	human	right	to	
democracy,	both	on	instrumental	and	on	intrinsic	grounds.	He	then	moves	on	to	the	right	to	self-
determination	and	offers	an	interpretation	of	this	right	as	grounded	in	the	protection	of	the	same	
interests	as	the	right	to	democracy.	This	step	aims	to	establish	that	there	is	no	necessary	conflict	
between	the	two	rights.2	The	final	step	of	the	argument	covers	the	case	of	the	right	to	self-
determination	of	undemocratic	states.	Christiano	handles	this	through	the	introduction	of	a	power	
to	waive	the	right	to	democracy.	He	writes:	“it	makes	sense	to	think	that	there	is	a	power	to	waive	
one’s	right	to	democracy	because	this	power	can	be	grounded	in	the	same	interests	in	asserting	
control	over	one’s	political	world	that	the	claim	right	to	democracy	is	grounded	in”	(ms	p.	22).	While	
the	right	to	self-determination	is	thus	contingent	on	the	right	to	democracy,	since	the	right	to	
democracy,	like	many	other	rights,	is	one	that	can	be	waived,	self-determination	is	possible	even	for	
certain	non-democratic	states.	
Christiano’s	argument	for	the	priority	of	democracy	is	intertwined	with	an	interest-based,	moral	
conception	of	human	rights.	On	this	interpretation,	the	case	for	the	human	right	to	democracy	rests	
on	the	moral	goods	that	democracy	protects.	And	the	case	for	the	compatibility	between	the	human	
right	to	democracy	and	the	human	right	to	self-determination	rests,	similarly,	on	the	fact	that	the	
two	rights	protect	the	same	moral	goods.	Both	the	right	to	democracy	and	the	right	to	self-
determination	are	defended	as	minimal	requirements	of	justice.	
Those	who	reject	the	human	right	to	democracy	tend	to	reject	the	sufficiency	of	such	justice-based	
arguments	for	establishing	a	human	right.	They	tend	to	argue	that	human	rights	are	and	should	be	
distinct	from	moral	rights	based	on	justice	–	because	of	what	human	rights	are	and/or	because	of	
																																								 																				
2	Gould	(2006)	and	Altman	and	Wellman	(2009)	have	also	offered	interpretations	of	the	right	to	self-
determination	as	requiring	democracy.	
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how	human	rights	are	justified.	They	don’t	deny	that	there	is	a	connection	between	justice	and	
democracy	for	some	societies.	But	they	deny	that	this	connection	is	sufficient	to	underpin	the	
human	right	to	democracy.		
There	are	two	main	ways	in	which	the	case	can	be	made.3	The	first	focuses	on	the	nature	of	human	
rights.	It	stresses	the	functional	role	of	human	rights,	for	example	with	regard	to	the	justification	of	
third-party	interventions	or	the	exclusion	from	the	international	community.	The	second	focuses	on	
the	justification	of	human	rights	and	appeals	to	non-parochial	normative	foundations	for	human	
rights.	In	John	Rawls’	treatment	of	human	rights,	as	well	as	in	some	other	approaches,	the	two	
aspects	are	not	sharply	distinguished	but	are	jointly	invoked	in	support	of	a	political	conception	of	
human	rights	that	can	underpin	international	legitimacy.	
In	this	comment,	I	shall	side	with	those	who	reject	the	justice-based	case	for	the	human	right	to	
democracy,	focusing	on	the	justificatory	challenge	that	human	rights	face.4	My	sympathies	are	with	
the	political	conception	of	human	rights.	I	think	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	about	human	rights	in	
straightforwardly	moral	terms,	as	discovered	rights	that	explicate	certain	universal	moral	facts.	This	
strikes	me	as	empirically	and	historically	inadequate.	It	also	obscures	the	significance	of	the	
achievement	of	contemporary	human	rights	practice,	namely	that	the	practice	has	created	a	
standard	for	international	political	legitimacy.	Human	rights	apply	to	national,	international	and	
global	politics.	This	standard	is	not	set	in	stone,	of	course:	human	rights	are	a	work	in	progress	and	
as	such	subject	to	both	negative	criticism	–	focusing	on	problems	of	the	current	set	of	standards	–	
and	positive	criticism	–	proposals	for	what	should	be	included.	But	while	the	achievement	may	be	
fragile,	this	does	not	lessen	the	normative	significance	of	the	political	project,	it	seems	to	me.	Vice	
versa,	the	attempt	to	overcome	this	fragility	by	providing	moral	foundations	to	this	project	risks	
being	too	parochial	to	be	successful.		
																																								 																				
3	I’m	using	Tasioulas’s	(2009)	helpful	distinction	here.	
4	It	is	based	on	ideas	that	I’ve	developed	more	fully	in	Peter	(2013a).	
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I	think	Christiano’s	argument	for	the	human	right	to	democracy	fails	because	it	doesn’t	sufficiently	
address	the	justificatory	challenge.	My	comment	doesn’t	focus	on	the	conflict	between	democracy	
and	self-determination,	however.	I	think	Christiano	is	right	to	question	the	priority	of	the	right	to	
self-determination.	Instead,	I	shall	contrast	the	justice-based	argument	for	a	human	right	to	
democracy	with	a	legitimacy-based	argument	for	a	human	right	to	political	participation	–	I	
understand	the	right	to	political	participation	in	a	weaker	sense	than	the	right	to	democracy.	But	I	
will	discuss	the	implications	of	this	right	to	political	participation	for	self-determination	in	the	final	
section.5		
2. Two	Conceptions	of	Human	Rights	
Christiano	provides	a	moral	defense	of	the	human	right	to	democracy.	The	defense	rests	on	two	
claims:	(i)	that	human	rights	are	best	interpreted	as	minimal	norms	of	justice	and	(ii)	that	minimal	
justice	requires	democracy.	Let	me	discuss	them	in	turn,	starting	with	the	conception	of	human	
rights.	
The	normative	commitment	at	the	core	of	Christiano’s	moral	defence	of	the	human	right	to	
democracy	is	that	each	person’s	interests	deserve	equal	consideration.	This	normative	commitment	
explains	both	the	significance	of	human	rights	and	the	value	of	democracy.	Adapting	a	Millian	
thought,	human	rights	are	moral	rights	grounded	in	the	protection	of	important	individual	interests.	
A	moral	right	to	x	is	a	human	right	when	the	interests	are	such	that	there	is	“a	strong	moral	
justification	for	any	state	to	respect,	protect,	and	promote	a	legal	or	conventional	right	to	x	in	all	
persons”	(ms	3).	Not	all	moral	rights	will	pass	this	test	and	so	not	all	moral	rights	are	necessarily	
human	rights.	
																																								 																				
5	I	shall	follow	Christiano	by	focusing	only	on	political	participation	in	the	domestic	context.	In	Peter	(2013a)	
I’ve	commented	on	the	possibility	of	broadening	the	right	to	political	participation	in	the	international	and	
global	context.	
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This	conception	of	human	rights	follows	the	orthodox	pattern.	The	orthodox	conception	contrasts	
with	a	political	conception	of	human	rights	with	regard	to	both	the	nature	of	human	rights	and	the	
justification	of	rights.	On	the	orthodox	conception,	human	rights	are	moral	rights	that	all	human	
beings	have	qua	salient	features	of	their	humanity.	Salient	features	may	relate	to	fundamental	
interests	(e.g.	Raz	1986)	or	basic	aspects	of	human	agency	(e.g.	Griffin	2008).	On	the	political	
conception,	human	rights	are	a	set	of	special	rights	that	have	their	origins	in	salient	features	of	
contemporary	human	rights	practice	(Beitz	2009).	Different	conceptions	identify	different	features	
of	this	practice	as	salient.6		
With	regard	to	the	question	of	what	justifies	human	rights,	defenders	of	the	orthodox	conception	
typically	maintain	that	ordinary	moral	reasoning	is	necessary	and	sufficient	to	establish	what	should	
count	as	a	human	right.	Defenders	of	the	political	conception,	by	contrast,	typically	maintain	that	
human	rights	are	based	on	political	norms	and	established	by	some	form	of	public	reason	or	public	
reasoning.		
There	are	important	objections	to	the	orthodox	conception	of	human	rights.	One	concerns	the	
justification	of	human	rights.	If	human	rights	are	to	function	as	a	standard	of	international	political	
legitimacy,	they	need	a	non-parochial	justification.	The	objection	against	the	orthodox	conception	is	
that	ordinary	moral	reasoning	produces	disagreement	and	as	such	cannot	justify	human	rights.		
																																								 																				
6	Note	that	in	addition	to	these	pure	forms	of	the	traditional	and	the	political	conception	of	human	rights,	
some	writers	have	recently	proposed	mixed	conceptions.	Joseph	Raz	(2007,	2010)	is,	I	think,	best	understood	
as	defending	a	mixed	conception.	He	accepts	the	political	conception	with	regard	to	the	first	dimension	–	with	
regard	to	the	question	of	what	human	rights	are.	But	he	combines	this	with	the	view	that	what	justifies	human	
rights	is	ordinary	moral	reasoning.	Rainer	Forst	(2010)	is	drawn	to	the	opposite	move:	he	defines	human	rights	
on	the	basis	of	salient	features	of	human	agency,	but	answers	the	question	of	how	they	are	justified	by	
invoking	an	account	of	public	reasoning.	
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I	don’t	think	Christiano	has	a	good	answer	to	this	objection.	He	may	claim	that	while	moral	
disagreement	is	indeed	common,	it	will	be	less	common	with	regard	to	the	minimal	requirements	of	
justice	on	which	his	account	of	the	human	right	to	democracy	rests.	That	may	or	may	not	be	so;	it’s	
an	empirical	question.	But	my	point	is	that	when	disagreements	do	occur	about	how	societies	should	
be	organized,	the	orthodox	account	doesn’t	have	a	strategy	to	confront	them.	Instead,	it	merely	
asserts	one	blueprint	for	how	society	should	be	organized.	
When	Rawls	originally	came	up	with	the	idea	of	a	political	conception	of	justice	for	the	domestic	
case	of	liberal	democracies,	he	proposed	to	circumvent	controversies	about	the	morality	of	justice	
by	developing	a	conception	of	justice	based	on	fundamental	political	values	embodied	in	democracy	
(Rawls	1993).	The	thought	was	that	while	we	might	disagree	about	the	good,	we	can	agree	that	we	
live	in	a	democracy	and	that	a	democracy	is	based	on	certain	values.	Defenders	of	a	political	
conception	of	human	rights	are	drawn	to	the	same	thought:	while	we	are	likely	to	disagree	about	
what	makes	a	life	go	well	and	what	people	need	to	make	their	lives	go	well,	we	can	agree	–	and	
that’s	the	achievement	of	the	contemporary	human	rights	practice	–	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	
human	rights	practice	and	that	this	practice	is	associated	with	certain	political	norms	and	values.	
Reference	to	salient	features	of	the	contemporary	practice	offers	a	way	of	settling	disagreements	
that	are	likely	to	arise	about	human	needs	and	interests.		
A	second	important	objection	to	the	orthodox	conception	is	that	it	has	the	wrong	account	of	what	
human	rights	are.	This	objection	comes	in	several	versions.	One	focuses	on	the	account	of	
universality	that	the	orthodox	conception	gives	rise	to.	With	regard	to	basic	human	rights	at	least,	
the	orthodox	conception	appears	to	be	committed	to	a	timelessness	about	human	rights	that	
doesn’t	sit	well	with	human	rights	practices.	Human	rights	are	not	timeless,	but	that	doesn’t	mean	
that	they	are	not	universal.	As	Raz	(2010:	41)	has	convincingly	argued,	human	rights	are	best	
understood	as	committed	to	synchronic	universality	–	as	rights	all	human	beings	alive	today	have.	
The	political	conception	can	easily	accommodate	synchronic	universality.	
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With	regard	to	the	human	right	to	democracy,	I	think	that	it	is	not	plausible	to	claim	timeless	
universality.	Democracy	is	a	political	institution	–	or,	more	accurately,	a	family	of	sets	of	political	
institutions	–	that	has	evolved	over	time	and,	who	knows,	that	may	further	evolve	in	the	future	or	
even	disappear	completely.	So	if	there	is	to	be	a	human	right	to	democracy	at	all,	it	can	only	be	a	
right	that	is	relative	to	specific	historical	circumstances.	But	once	this	point	is	accepted,	the	question	
whether	the	relevant	historical	circumstances	currently	obtain	internationally	is	once	again	wide	
open.	The	moral	case	for	a	human	right	to	democracy	thus	doesn’t	seem	to	achieve	that	much.	
A	related	version	of	the	objection	states	that	human	rights	are	a	set	of	explicitly	political	norms	that	
only	make	sense	in	certain	institutional	contexts	(Beitz	2009).	Human	rights	get	their	distinctive	
content	not	from	essential	features	of	humanity	as	such,	but	from	institutionalized	relations	
between	individuals	and	their	governments	and	other	political	agents.	The	political	conception	of	
human	rights	is	better	equipped	to	capture	this	aspect	of	human	rights	practice	than	the	traditional	
conception.	Many	have	argued	that	this	objection	fails,	however,	as	the	orthodox	conception	of	
human	rights	can	incorporate	the	institutional	specificity	of	human	rights	(e.g.	Liao	and	Etinson	
2012).	Indeed,	as	we	saw,	Christiano’s	version	of	the	orthodox	conception	also	emphasizes	the	role	
of	the	international	community	and	of	international	law	for	human	rights.		
Still,	the	relationship	between	human	rights	and	the	institutional	context	that	Christiano	postulates	
rests	on	a	set	of	fundamental	interests	that	he	identifies	as	essential	features	of	humanity	to	which	a	
conception	of	justice	responds.	As	such,	Christiano	offers	a	particular	moral	interpretation	of	the	
political	project	that	human	rights	stand	for.	But	I	don’t	think	that	a	moral	interpretation	best	
furthers	the	human	rights	project;	it’s	too	divisive.	This	gets	me	back	to	the	problem	of	justifying	
human	rights.	The	political	conception	of	human	rights	can	deal	with	the	specifically	political	project	
that	human	rights	are	more	directly	and	already	factors	in	the	justificatory	problem.	
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3. Justice,	Legitimacy,	and	the	Human	Right	to	Democracy	
Is	it	possible	for	Christiano	to	argue	that	because	of	the	special	way	in	which	his	approach	
emphasizes	the	link	between	justice	and	democracy,	the	objection	from	disagreement	and	the	
problem	of	justifying	human	rights	are	taken	into	account?	I	don’t	think	he	can	and	that’s	because	I	
don’t	think	his	argument	for	the	human	right	to	democracy	works.	
Christiano	defends	democracy	on	both	instrumental	and	intrinsic	grounds.	The	instrumental	
argument,	more	fully	developed	in	Christiano	(2011),	is	based	on	the	empirical	claim	that	
democracies	better	protect	a	range	of	human	rights	than	non-democracies.	There	are	some	
questions	about	this	argument	(Lister	2012;	Reidy	2012).	One	is	whether	the	correlation	is	actually	
with	democracy	or	whether	it	is	instead	with	observance	of	the	rule	of	law.	If	the	correlation	is	with	
democracy,	another	question	is	whether	democracy	is	strictly	necessary	for	the	protection	of	the	
other	human	rights	or	merely	often	associated	with	it.	Rawls,	for	example,	captured	the	possibility	of	
peoples	that	are	non-democratic	yet	not	human	rights	violating,	through	his	category	of	“decent	
societies”	(1999:	4).	I	shall	leave	these	worries	about	the	instrumental	defence	of	democracy	to	the	
side.	
The	intrinsic	argument	is	based	on	democracy’s	egalitarianism	and	is	developed	more	fully	in	the	
Constitution	of	Equality.	It	starts	from	the	normative	commitment	that	each	person’s	interests	
matter	equally.	According	to	this	“egalitarian”	argument,	democracy	is	distinctive	because	it	is	the	
only	political	regime	that	publicly	affirms	equality.	Here	is	what	Christiano	has	to	say	in	support	of	
the	relationship	between	democracy	and	justice	understood	as	the	public	affirmation	of	equality:		
“The	fundamental	argument	for	democracy	at	the	domestic	level	is	that	it	is	necessary	to	the	
public	realization	of	the	equal	advancement	of	the	interests	of	the	members	of	society.	
Persons	have	fundamental	political	interests	in	shaping	the	society	they	live	in.	They	have	
interests	in	correcting	for	the	cognitive	biases	of	others	in	determining	how	to	shape	the	
society.	They	have	interests	in	being	at	home	in	the	world	they	live.	And	they	have	interests	
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in	being	recognized	and	affirmed	as	equals.	Against	the	background	of	conflict	of	interest,	
disagreement,	cognitive	bias	and	fallibility	on	how	best	to	organize	society,	the	only	public	
way	of	realizing	the	equality	of	persons	in	a	society	is	to	give	each	an	equal	say	in	how	to	
shape	society”	(ms.	9).	
The	demand	for	democracy	is	supported	by	three	considerations,	situated	in	a	context	of	four	main	
facts	about	our	judgments	about	how	the	world	should	be	organized.	The	four	facts	are:	(i)	conflict	
of	interest,	(ii)	cognitive	bias,	(iii)	fallibility,	and,	presumably	as	a	consequence	of	the	first	three,	(iv)	
extensive	disagreement.	The	considerations	supporting	democracy	are	(i)	the	interest	in	correcting	
the	cognitive	bias	of	others,	(ii)	the	interest	in	being	at	home	in	the	world,	and	(iii)	the	interest	to	be	
recognized	and	respected.	The	main	idea	uniting	them	is	that	there	is	value	in	the	connection	
between	people’s	judgments	about	how	the	world	should	be	organized	and	how	the	world	is	
actually	organized.	And	only	democracy	can	deliver	the	right	kind	of	connection	between	the	two,	
Christiano	argues:	
“the	only	public	way	to	realize	equality	is	to	ensure	that	persons	have	equal	opportunities	to	
shape	the	society	in	accordance	with	their	judgments.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	other	
substantive	forms	of	equality	are	not	important	but	it	is	to	say	that	they	cannot	achieve	the	
public	realization	of	equality	under	the	normal	circumstances	of	political	societies	if	the	
democratic	realization	is	not	present.	Democracy	is	indispensable	for	this”	(ms	p.	10).	
I	want	to	ask	two	main	questions	about	this	intrinsic	argument.	First,	is	the	intrinsic	argument	a	good	
argument	for	democracy?	And,	second,	does	it	support	a	human	right	to	democracy?	
I	am	very	much	in	sympathy	with	Christiano’s	characterization	of	the	background	conditions	that	
shape	political	decisions	and	the	evaluation	of	political	institutions.	I	also	think	he’s	right	to	
emphasize	the	significance	of	political	participation	as	such	and	not	just	its	outcomes.	But	I’m	not	
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convinced	by	his	justice-based	argument	for	why	political	participation	is	significant	and	as	a	result	
I’m	not	convinced	by	his	argument	for	democracy.		
As	others	have	also	pointed	out	(e.g.	Estlund	2009),	Christiano’s	argument	for	democracy	faces	an	
epistemic	challenge.	The	challenge	is:	why	assume	that	democracy	performs	better	than	alternative	
political	regimes	in	securing	the	“public	realization	of	the	equal	advancement	of	the	interests	of	the	
members	of	society”?	Or,	to	put	the	same	point	slightly	differently,	what	is	the	link	between	equality	
as	a	constraint	on	the	decision-making	procedure	and	equality	as	a	constraint	on	the	results?	As	we	
saw,	Christiano’s	“egalitarian”	argument	aims	to	show	that	given	the	background	conditions	of	
politics,	only	democracy	can	secure	(i)	the	interest	in	correcting	the	cognitive	bias	of	others,	(ii)	the	
interest	in	being	at	home	in	the	world,	and	(iii)	the	interest	to	be	recognized	and	respected.		
But,	surely,	even	if	we	accept	Christiano’s	moral	theory,	it’s	too	strong	to	claim	we	each	value	our	
own	political	participation	in	order	to	secure	these	interests.	I	may	have	an	interest	that	the	
cognitive	bias	of	others	is	corrected	–	by	me	or	by	someone	else.	If	someone	else	is	able	to	correct	
others’	cognitive	biases	on	my	behalf,	that	must	be	sufficient.	Similarly,	I	may	have	an	interest	in	
seeing	a	connection	between	my	judgment	about	how	the	world	should	be	organized	and	how	the	
world	is	organized.		But	that	doesn’t	imply	that	I	necessarily	have	an	interest	in	expressing	my	
judgment.	Finally,	the	interest	to	be	recognized	and	respected	need	also	not	have	its	prime	
expression	through	political	participation	–	it	may	be	possible	for	me	to	be	recognized	and	respected	
in	other	ways	that	are	more	important.	If	we	grant	these	limitations	on	the	moral	value	of	the	
collective	decision-making	procedure,	however,	then	the	necessary	link	to	democracy	is	lost.	It	then	
becomes	possible	that	non-democratic	decision-making	procedures	are	better	suited	than	
democracy	to	achieve	a	certain	desirable	outcome.	
To	argue	for	democracy,	I	think	it	is	necessary	to	combine	an	argument	for	political	equality	with	an	
epistemic	argument.	One	way	to	do	that	is	by	focusing	on	how	democracy	performs	and	by	
defending	it	on	grounds	of	its	potential	to	achieve	just	outcomes.	David	Estlund	(2008)	has	adopted	
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this	epistemic	instrumentalist	approach,	but	I	don’t	think	that	it	is	successful	either.	Instead,	I	think	
democracy	is	best	defended	on	grounds	of	the	procedural	epistemic	values	that	it	embodies,	values	
that	become	significant	in	circumstances	where	a	collective	cannot	establish	what	the	correct	
decision	would	be	(Peter	2008;	2013b).		
While	the	epistemic	instrumentalist	option,	if	it	were	successful,	would	retain	the	link	between	
justice	and	democracy,	the	epistemic	proceduralist	alternative	that	I	favour	distinguishes	more	
sharply	between	the	legitimacy	of	democratic	decision-making	and	the	justice	of	its	outcomes.	The	
idea	is	not	that	democracy	is	legitimate	because	it	tends	to	produce	just	outcomes.	It	is,	rather,	that	
legitimacy	is	a	normative	concept	in	its	own	right,	significant	in	circumstances	where	more	
comprehensive	moral	assessments	fail	–	because	of	value	pluralism,	for	example.	The	reason	why	I	
favour	the	epistemic	proceduralist	approach	is	because	I	think	that	democracy	has	its	natural	space	
in	situations	where	there	is	no	access	to	a	privileged	position	from	which	to	make	valid	assertions	
about	which	decision	should	be	made	and	where	democratic	procedures	are	themselves	
epistemically	valuable.	When	it	is	possible	to	make	valid	factual	or	moral	claims	about	how	society	
should	be	organized,	there	is	less	scope	for	democracy.	
This	epistemic	argument	undermines	the	justice-based	case	for	democracy	even	for	the	domestic	
context	of	liberal	democracies.	Meanwhile,	many	societies	do	not	currently	have	political	institutions	
that	resemble	a	democracy.	What	are	the	implications	of	a	legitimacy-based	argument	for	a	human	
right	to	democracy	for	those	societies?	I	don’t	think	that	there	is	a	clear	legitimacy-based	case	for	a	
human	right	to	democracy.	I	shall	focus	on	the	ideal	itself,	leaving	aside	problems	that	would	arise	
with	implementing	a	particular	set	of	democratic	institutions	(Beitz	2009).	
Can	political	institutions	that	are	not	fully	democratic	–	whatever	exactly	that	is	supposed	to	mean	–
produce	legitimate	decisions?	The	dominant	view	in	democratic	theory	and	democratization	
research	has	been	that	political	institutions	that	are	not	fully	democratic	are	seen	as	deficient	and	in	
need	of	correction	in	direction	of	full	democracy.	The	recent	literature	on	democratization	(e.g.,	
12	
	
Carothers	2002)	challenges	this	so-called	transitional	paradigm,	however.		Based	on	research	on	new	
forms	of	political	participation	both	in	Western	liberal	democracies	and	in	countries	with	other	
political	regimes,	an	alternative	paradigm	in	democratization	research	is	emerging	that	focuses	on	
the	possibility	of	a	stable	coexistence	of	elements	from	different	regime	types	–	democratic	and	
authoritarian	–	and	examines	the	diversity	of	channels	of	political	participation	beyond	traditional	
democratic	electoral	politics	(e.g.,	Norris	2002).		The	transitional	paradigm	suggests	a	false	dualism	
between	politically	legitimate	democracies	and	illegitimate	non-democracies.	The	dualism	is	false	
because	it	obscures	the	many	ways	in	which	even	established	liberal	democracies	contain	
authoritarian	elements	and,	vice	versa,	how	there	can	be	multiple	forms	of	political	participation	
beyond	those	narrowly	associated	with	a	human	right	to	democracy.	If	the	transitional	paradigm	is	
rejected	in	favour	of	a	more	pluralist	model	of	political	regimes,	however,	the	legitimacy-based	case	
for	a	human	right	to	democracy	crumbles.		
This	said,	I	find	it	very	plausible	that	some	political	participation	must	be	possible	in	light	of	the	
background	conditions	of	politics	that	Christiano	lists:	cognitive	bias,	fallibility,	conflict	of	interest,	
and	disagreement.	Nothing	in	what	I	have	said	so	far,	however,	forces	me	to	deny	that	there	is	a	
right	to	political	participation	as	recognized	by	the	Universal	Declaration	and	the	Covenant	on	Civil	
and	Political	Rights.	And	that	is	because	the	right	to	political	participation,	while	it	is	frequently	
interpreted	as	a	right	to	democracy,	can	be	interpreted	in	weaker	terms.	Henry	Steiner	(1988)	
argues	that	human	rights	conventions	encourage	full-fledged	democratic	participation	as	a	
programmatic	ideal,	but	they	do	not	require	it.7	The	right	to	political	participation	has	two	parts:	an	
“election	clause”	and	a	“take	part”	clause	(Steiner	1988:	86).	The	take	part	clause	is	too	vague	to	
require	any	particular	political	system	and	would	be	satisfied	by	a	right	to	participate	in	deliberative	
political	processes.	The	elections	clause	is	more	specific,	but	it,	too,	can	be	satisfied	by	political	
																																								 																				
7	See	also	Lister	(2012)	for	a	recent	argument	in	favour	of	treating	democracy	as	an	aspirational	ideal,	but	not	
as	a	human	right.	
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systems	other	than	democratic	self-government	as	modelled,	say,	on	modern	Western	democracies.	
Both	clauses	can	thus	be	interpreted	in	ways	that	do	not	require	democracy.	The	right	to	political	
participation,	understood	in	this	way,	neither	presupposes	democratic	institutions	nor	does	it	
demand	that	they	be	imposed	where	they	are	absent.		
4. Political	Participation	and	Self-determination	
In	this	final	part	of	my	comment	I	want	to	return	to	my	starting-point,	the	relationship	between	a	
right	to	democracy	and	a	right	to	self-determination.	The	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	
recognizes	both	a	right	to	self-determination	(article	1)	and	a	right	to	political	participation	(article	
25).	The	official	comment	on	article	25	explicitly	addresses	the	relationship	to	article	1	and	
emphasizes	that	the	two	rights	are	not	in	tension.	It	explains	that	while	the	right	to	self-
determination	is	a	right	of	peoples,	the	right	to	political	participation	is	a	right	of	individuals.	The	
right	to	political	participation,	as	mentioned,	is	the	right	of	individuals	to	take	part	in	political	affairs,	
including	in	some	form	of	elections.	According	to	the	right	to	self-determination,	peoples	should	be	
free	to	choose	their	constitution	and	their	“economic,	social,	and	cultural	development”.	This	article	
also	formulates	an	obligation	on	all	peoples	to	foster	and	respect	the	self-determination	of	other	
peoples.		
To	point	to	the	distinction	between	a	right	of	individuals	and	a	right	of	peoples	doesn’t	seem	
sufficient	to	rule	out	conflict,	however.	It	is	entirely	possible	that	a	particular	right	of	peoples	has	
implications	that	are	in	tension	with	some	rights	of	individuals	and,	vice	versa,	that	rights	of	
individuals	have	implications	for	the	decision-making	of	peoples.	I	thus	think	that	Christiano	is	right	
to	probe	deeper.	As	mentioned,	his	paper	attempts	to	dispel	conflict	by	de-prioritising	the	right	to	
self-determination	and	providing	an	account	of	the	right	to	self-determination	that	rests	on	the	right	
to	democracy.	According	to	Christiano,	there	is	no	right	to	self-determination	that	is	compatible	with	
the	denial	of	the	right	to	democracy.	Self-determination,	properly	understood,	just	is	the	expression	
of	the	collective	exercise	of	the	right	to	democracy	or,	as	an	added	twist,	of	the	collective	waiver	–	
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not	denial	–	of	the	right	to	democracy.	The	right	to	self-determination	protects	both	the	collective	
exercise	of	the	right	to	democracy	and	the	collective	waiver	of	this	right.	
While	this	solution	is	very	elegant,	I’m	not	convinced	by	its	normative	appeal.	And	that	is	because	I	
don’t	believe	that	the	moral	case	for	a	human	right	to	democracy	is	successful.	As	I’ve	argued	in	the	
previous	section,	I	think	we	should	pursue	a	legitimacy-based	approach	and	that	this	approach	can	
only	support	a	human	right	to	political	participation,	not	a	right	to	democracy.	But	if	there	is	no	case	
for	a	human	right	to	democracy,	then	the	interpretation	of	the	right	to	self-determination	as	based	
on	the	right	to	democracy	also	fails.	And	if	we	reject	that	interpretation,	then	the	tension	resurfaces:	
while	the	right	to	democracy	implies	that	a	particular	constitution	should	be	imposed	on	peoples,	
the	right	to	self-determination	implies	greater	choice	in	this	regard.	
Still,	I	think	Christiano	is	right	that	we	should	question	the	priority	of	an	unqualified	right	to	self-
determination.	Is	it	possible	to	endorse	the	priority	of	the	right	to	political	participation	and	
reconcile	it	with	the	right	to	self-determination?	I	think	this	is	possible,	along	the	lines	of	what	the	
comment	on	article	25	suggests.	If	the	right	to	political	participation	is	interpreted	in	a	weaker	sense	
than	the	right	to	democracy,	it	does	not	presuppose	a	blue-print	for	how	society	should	be	
organized.	As	such,	it	can,	more	plausibly	than	the	right	to	democracy,	be	interpreted	in	
individualistic	terms,	as	a	right	to	be	heard	in	processes	of	public	reasoning.	Beyond	that,	it	leaves	it	
to	peoples	to	determine	what	set	of	institutions	they	want	to	adopt.		
Is	that	proposal	unappealing	because	it	is	too	undemanding?	I	don’t	think	so.	Note,	first,	that	human	
rights	don’t	fully	determine	political	legitimacy	–	additional	domestic	constraints	would	apply.	In	
addition,	the	human	right	to	political	participation	is	only	one	element,	albeit	an	important	one,	of	
the	minimal	requirements	of	legitimacy.	But,	more	positively,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	a	human	right	
to	political	participation	in	the	weak	sense	is	more	empowering	than	the	human	right	to	democracy,	
precisely	because	it	does	not	presuppose	any	particular	set	of	institutions.	It	puts	the	choice	of	
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political	institutions	more	directly	in	people's	hands	than	a	version	of	this	right	that	is	constrained	by	
a	particular	moral	blueprint.	
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